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ALL DRIED OUT: HOW RESPONSES TO DROUGHT
MAKE DROUGHTS WORSE

Vanessa Casado P6rez*
Water usage is governed through a variety of mechanisms, includinggovernment administrationand market tools. From 2006 to 2008, the region of Barcelona,a water scarce
area,suffered a drought comparable to the onefaced today by the US. West. This article
surveys a variety of techniques that were and could have been used to address these scarcity challenges. Spanish water regulationsestablishedwater markets in 1999, but neither
the design nor its implementation was optimal. In addition to the design and implementation flaws, the response to the 2007-2008 drought crisisshowed how emergency measures
highjacked water markets as a viable solution to water scarcity. Emergency responses
bailed out urban voters while no structuralsolutions were adopted to make water use in
the agriculturalsector more efficient. Thus, neither the urban suppliers nor the agriculturalsector had incentives to participatein a water market, and the drought was managed
using ad hoc solutions. The U.S. West can draw lessons to tackle the current andfuture
droughtsfrom Spain 's responses to its water crisis.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Water scarcity is a growing global issue. A vast literature surrounding water governance techniques to address scarcity focuses heavily on the potential of water markets.'
Catalonia, Spain suffered from two consecutive droughts in the four-year period between
2004 and 2008.2 Catalan towns and villages were subjected to water restrictions. Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, was on the brink of severe domestic water restrictions on
household usage. This article illustrates the inability of an administrative governance regime to deal with drought conditions through the novel case study of the 2007-2008
drought in Barcelona and its surroundings, an area which suffers from structural water
scarcity. This drought crisis unveiled the instances where markets could be introduced and
how the piecemeal response undertaken by Spanish and Catalan authorities exacerbated
the scarcity problems going forward, since their policies undermined water markets.
Water market scholarship has offered not only theoretical accounts but also case
studies, the majority of them grounded in the Western United States' prior appropriation
systems. 3 This article provides a novel overview of water regulation in Catalonia, Spain,
with an emphasis on the administrative response during the 2007-2008 drought. By placing
the market proposals in a specific case study of an administrative-centered water management system, this paper opens the door to the introduction of water markets in those jurisdictions where the right to use water is allocated by granting permits. Hence, it offers an

1. The free-market environmentalist position is framed in, among other sources, TERRY L. ANDERSON &
PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP 7 (Cato Institute 1997); WATER
MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION 32 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). See also R. SMITH,
TRADING WATER: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER MARKETING (The Council of State Policy and Planning Agencies 1988); James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western PriorAppropriation States:
A Modelfor the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429 (2004); Mark W. Rosegrant & Hans P. Binswanger, Markets in
Tradable Water Rights: Potentialfor Efficiency Gains in Developing Country Water Resource Allocation, 22
WORLD DEV. 1613 (1994); Mateen Thobani, Tradable Property Rights to Water: How to Improve Water Use
and Resolve Water Conflicts, VIEWPOINT (The World Bank, Private Sector Dev. Dep't.), at 1 (Feb. 1995). For a
more nuanced position, see for example, Robert Glennon, The Questfor More Water: Why Markets Are Inevitable, PERC REP., Sept. 2006, at 7, http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/septO6.pdf. See also Robert Glennon,
Water Scarcity,Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV 1873 (2005); Joseph L. Sax, UnderstandingTransfers: Community Rights and the Privatizationof Water, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 33 (2008).
2. Pedro Brufao Curiel, La Regulaci6n juridical de las sequias: Critica a la regulaci6n extraordinaria y urgente de un fen6meno natural y ciclico propio del clima, 187 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACI6N PIUBLICA 199, 211
(2012).
3. There are several articles on specific water markets in the Western U.S. See, e.g., Bonnie G. Colby, Mark
A. McGinnis & Ken A. Rait, MitigatingEnvironmentalExternalities Through Voluntary and Involuntary Water
Reallocation: Nevada's Truckee-Carson River Basin, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 757 (1991); Robert Glennon &
Michael J. Pearce, TransferringMainstream Colorado River Water Rights: The Arizona Experience,49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 235 (2007); Ellen Hanak & Caitlin Dyckman, Counties Wresting Control: Local Responses to California's
Statewide Water Market, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 490 (2003); Richard Howitt & Ellen Hanak, Incremental
Water Market Development: The California WaterSector 1985-2004,30 CAN. WATER RES. J. 73 (2005); Ronald
A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 181 (1996); Kevin M. O'Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in CaliforniaRevisited: The Legacy
of the 1987-92 Drought, 25 PAC. L.J. 1053 (1994); Brandon Winchester & Ereney Hadjigeorgalis, An Institutional Frameworkfor a Water Market in Elephant Butte IrrigationDistrict,49 NAT. RES. J. 219 (2009).
Chile, which has a very strong private rights framework, has also been the object of several case studies. See,
e.g., ROBERT R. HEARNE, Institutional and OrganisationalArrangements for Water Markets in Chile, in
MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE 181 (K. W. Easter, M. W. Rosegrant & A. Dinar cds.,
1998); Carl J. Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth: The PoliticalEconomy of Water Rights in Chile,
1976-95, 25 WORLD DEV. 639 (1997); Carl J. Bauer, Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the
Neoliberal Model in Chile, 38 NAT. RES. J. 109 (1998); Erency Hadjigeorgalis, Comerciandocon incertidumbre:
los mercados de agua en la agriculturachilena [Trading with Uncertainty: Water Markets in Chilean Agriculture], 41 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMiA 3 (2004).
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approximation of how water markets could work in those Eastern United States, where
states have adopted models of regulated riparianism. 4 Prior appropriation jurisdictions,
which share many of the scarcity challenges Mediterranean regions are suffering, could
also learn from Catalonia's experience. Most of these jurisdictions have adopted a permit
system codifying the common law requirements and requiring users to apply before an
administrative agency for a water right.
Part I describes the institutional system of water management in Catalonia. This is a
necessary step in order to understand what measures could be taken to solve the mismatches between supply and demand, and more specifically, which gaps water markets
could fill. Those mismatches and the status of water resources during the 2007-2008
drought are examined in Part 11. Part III surveys the measures that were or could have been
used to manage water scarcity in Catalonia-either by increasing supply or decreasing
demand-and underscores the role that water markets could have played as mechanisms
to help mitigate the effects of droughts and structural scarcity. The design and implementation of water markets in Catalonia is compared to the California experience, since water
markets in Spain often look up to the Golden State's expertise. Part IV concludes by describing which lessons can be drawn from the response to the drought in Catalonia for
other jurisdictions.
II. AN OVERVIEW

OF THE CATALAN WATER SYSTEM

This section provides a novel, descriptive account of the institutional details of water
supply in Catalonia, Spain. Barcelona and its densely populated suburbs provide a compelling case study because its issues with water scarcity mirror the struggles increasingly
faced by urban areas throughout the world. Barcelona is not settled in the most water rich
area, and its demand has long grown to levels where it exceeds immediate available supply, particularly when periodical drought episodes strike. This section offers an institutional overview of Catalonian water supply and usage.
In Spain, water is public property, and its management is controlled by administrative agencies. Typically, the water agencies deciding on the allocation of water are either
the basin authorities (ConfederacionesHidrogrdficas)or the agencies set forth by regional
government, depending on whether the basin is under the power of the central or regional
government. In Catalonia, there are two relevant basin agencies: the Confederaci6n Hidrogrdfica del Ebro for the Ebro Basin, which is shared with several other regions, and
L 'Ag~ncia Catalanade l'Aigua (ACA), which is in charge of the Internal Basins. 5 These
two agencies are in charge of long-term planning and, following a cumbersome administrative procedure, granting permits for water use.
The agencies may subsequently review the permits in order to reduce the volume
granted. However, it is not common for them to do so because some user groups, like
farmers, are extremely powerful. 6 The Spanish or Catalan legislative or executive branches
4. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, § 9.01, The Early Regulation of Riparian Rights, in WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2016). For an account of the evolution to regulated riparianism, see
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the UnitedStates, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 85 (2011).

5.
ACA is a public body which operates under private law for most of its activities. Decret legislatiu
3/2003, de 4 de novembre, pci qual s'aprova el Text ref6s de la legislaci6 en matrria d'aigues de Catalunya
[Legislative decree approving the Consolidated text of Catalan legislation in relation to water] art. 7.2 (DOGC
2003, 4015).
6. Antonio Embid Irujo, Universidad de Zaragoza, Conference Paper for EXPO Zaragoza 2008: Asignaci6n
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not only set the framework for these basin institutions, but they also make some of the
operational decisions, even in times of emergency. 7 In the 2007-2008 drought, the Spanish
government decided on the building of interconnections, and the Catalan legislature imposed duties on utility companies and passed general restrictions curtailing the water use
rights of irrigators. 8 ACA also manages Aigiies Ter-Llobregat(ATLL), the main wholesale
distributor in Catalonia. It supplies water to the gates of more than one hundred municipalities. 9 ATLL holds water use rights in different rivers of the Internal Basins, is the titleholder to several wells, and owns desalination plants.' 0 In total, it supplies 65% of the
water used in the Metropolitan Region. The other 35% is self-supplied from the different
sources (surface water, groundwater, etc.) by the water utilities themselves. At the local
level, the municipal government is responsible for water provisions in their municipalities,
and it may decide to manage it publicly or to outsource management to a private company.
In the case of Barcelona, the private company Aigiies de Barcelonasupplies the city and
twenty-two other municipalities,' 2 serving as a good example of horizontal integration and
explained possibly by economies of density. To supply Barcelona and its surrounding area,
Aigiies de Barcelona buys water from ATLL and from desalination plants, and it holds
13
surface and groundwater rights.
It is important to note that farmers, especially those with small operations, do not
hold permits. Instead they receive water from irrigation institutions, which hold the water
rights licenses. In Spain, these institutions are organized in comunidades de regantes(irrigation communities), which are semi-public bodies. Farmers pay for their water, but tariffs are highly subsidized. The rate-setting power lies in the comunidad,but the basin authority has veto power. 14 The members of these communities were the potential sellers in
the water markets discussed in the Segre and Ebro regions during the 2007-2008 drought.
The interlocutors of the public administrators were not individual farmers but these communities, the Comunitat Generalde Regants dels Canals d'Urgell5 and the Comunitatde

del agua y gesti6n de laescasez en Espafia: los mercados de derechos de aguas [Water allocation and scarcity
management in Spain: water rights markets] 4 (2008), http://www.zaragoza.es/contenidos/medioambiente/cajaAzul/35S11 -P1-Antonio%20EmbidACC.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Josefina Maestu, ed., Public Participationin River Basin Management in Spain: "Reflecting
changes in external and self-created context" 40 (HarmoniCOP Project, Workpackage 4) (2003),
http://www.harmonicop.uni-osnabrueck.de/ files/_down/Spain.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Decret legislatiu 84/2007, de 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesurcs excepcionals i d'emergrncia en
relaci6 amb lautilizaci6 dels recursos hidrics [Legislative decree 84/2007, of April 3, the adoption of exceptional
measures regarding the use of water resources] art. 18 (DOGC 2007, 4860).
9. 4mbito de actuaci6n, ATLL, http://www.atll.cat/cs/page.asp?id=5# (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
10. Dessalinitzadora del Llobregat, ATLL, http://www.atll.cat/ca/page.asp?id=135 (last visited Mar. 27,
2016).
11. Joan Armengol & Josep Dolz, L 'abastamentd'aigua de Catalunya i laseva garantia [Water supply in
Cataloniaand its guarantee],93-94 NOTES D'ECONOMIA 127, 132 (2009).
12. Aigiies de Barcelonaen dades, AIGGES DE BARCELONA, http://www.aiguesdebarcelona.cat/ca/aigues-debarcelona-en-datos (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
13. Fonts d'abastament,AIGOES DE BARCELONA, http://www.aiguesdcbarcelona.cat/ca/las-fuentes-de-abastecimiento (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
14. Articles 81-85 of the Consolidated Water Act establish the basic regulations for these irrigation communities. See The Consolidated Water Act arts. 81-85 (B.O.E. 2001, 176) (Spain) [hereinafter CWA].
15. COMUNITAT GENERAL DE REGANTS DELS CANALS D'URGELL, http://www.canalsurgell.cat (last visited

Mar. 20,2012).
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Regants de la Dreta16 i de l'Esquerrade l'Ebre17 respectively. These communities operate
the infrastructure that diverts water from the stream to the individual farmers' gates. For
example, the Comunitatde Regants dels Canalsd'Urgelloperates the Urgell Canal, which
18
brings water to more than 70,000 hectares.
IlL. WATER SCARCITY IN CATALONIA

Water scarcity is defined as the situation in which "demand exceeds the water resources exploitable under sustainable conditions."' 19 Scarcity is a growing problem in regions all over the world. The Barcelona metropolitan area suffers from a structural water
deficit-a negative water balance-because local water demand is higher than water supply. It is structural because the deficit is not only present in times of drought. Droughts
worsen the problem.
There are two water regions in Catalonia. One water region is supplied by the Ebro
River Basin, which is a basin shared with other Spanish regions. The other, slightly larger
water region is supplied by the Internal Basins, that is, rivers which only flow within Catalan territory. Given the interregional nature of the Ebro River, it is managed by a Basin
Organization, the Confederaci6n Hidrogrfica del Ebro. Though the regional governments are represented in this organization's governing bodies, the Spanish central government plays the leading role with the greatest number of votes in the collegiate decisionmaking bodies and the power to appoint the highest official.20 The Internal Basins are
managed by an agency of the Catalan regional government (ACA), which also plays the
role of the Basin Organization required by the 2000 Water Framework European Di2
rective. '
These two water regions in Catalonia are different in many dimensions. For example, they have a very different distribution of uses. Ninety-five percent of the demand in
the Catalan area supplied by the Ebro Basin is devoted to agricultural use, while only 36%
of the demand supplied by the Internal Basins goes to agriculture. 22 The other 64% of
23
demand is distributed in the following way: 43% for urban uses and 21% for industry.
The Ebro is the more plentiful of the Spanish rivers, while the Internal Basins are more
stressed watercourses. The Internal Basins, which cover 40% of the total Catalan demand,
are the source of water for 92% of the Catalan population, mainly because they supply

16.

COMUNITAT GENERAL DE REGANTS DEL CANAL DE LA DRETA DE L'EBRE,

http://www.comunitatre-

gants.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
17. COMUNITAT DE REGANTS - SINDICAT AGRiCOLA DE L' EBRE, http://www.regantsesquerra.cat (last visited
Mar. 20, 2012).
18. 1d.
19. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the EuropeanParliamentaddressingthe challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union, at 2, COM (July 18, 2007), http://www.eea.europa.cu/policy-documents/addressing-the-challenge-of-water. For a broader definition, see Hot issues: water
scarcity, FAO WATER, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/issucs/scarcity.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) ("Imbalances
between availability and demand, the degradation of groundwater and surface water quality, intersectoral competition, interregional and international conflicts, all contributes to water scarcity.").
20. Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2001, de 20 de julio, por clque se aprueba eltexto refundido de laLey de
Aguas. CWA arts. 27-29 (B.O.E. 2001, 176) (Spain).
21. Council Directive 2000/60, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 8 (EC).
22. Armengol & Dolz, supra note 1I,at 127.
23. Id.
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Barcelona's Metropolitan Area.2 4 The water supply of the Metropolitan Area is a challenge
for the Internal Basins. It represents 60% of the Catalan population and produces 50% of
its GDP. 25 Forty-seven percent of the demand in the Internal Basins region comes from
the Metropolitan Area. 26 This distribution shows two characteristics of current scarcity
crisis: the disparity between where water is allocated and where population concentrates
and the tension between uses, because the majority of water is allocated to agricultural
areas. The solutions employed by Catalan may serve as an example for many other jurisdictions with similar problems.
The Internal Basins are composed of mainly two systems: the Ter River and the
Llobregat River, which are increasingly interconnected. 27 The stressed Llobregat River
flows into the Barcelona area, but not the Ter River, 28 which is more plentiful and supplies
more water. Infrastructure was established to ensure supply from the Ter to the Metropolitan Area, to which this river is the principal contributor.29 Both rivers have been dammed
in order to mitigate the uneven temporal distribution of water, guaranteeing supply. 30 Interconnections solve problems of spatial distribution, and dams level out temporal distribution. But the evolution of supply and demand, coupled with drought crises, has deemed
these measures insufficient.
The spatial deficit makes the Barcelona area very dependent on neighboring areas.
This deficit is particularly troublesome in an area with climate variability, which means
that water is unevenly distributed across the year and across the territory. In drought times,

24. Id. at 128.
25. Id.
26. Id. Carla Romeu Dalmau, Judit Pcrarnau Terradellas & Laia Dom6nech Pretus, Conference Paper for
the XI Coloquio lbdrico de Gcografia: Medidas de urgenciafrentea medidas preventivas ante la sequia: una
reflexi6n para el caso de la regi6n metropolitanade Barcelona [UrgentMeasures versus Preventive Measures
to Tackle Drought:A Reflection for the BarcelonaMetropolitanArea] 6 (Jan. 2008) (on file with the author).
27. Estaci6
distribuidora de
Fonsanta [Distribution Plant at
Fonsanta], ATLL,
http://www.atll.cat/ca/page.asp?id=133 (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) (A new pipeline will unite the Ter and the
Llobregat River Systems by uniting two pumping stations in the outskirts of Barcelona. The pipeline can be used
in two directions.); La xarxa de distribuci6,ATLL, http://www.atll.cat/ca/page.asp?id=32 (last visited Mar. 27,
2016).
28. Interview with Gabriel Borrs & A. Didguez, ACA's adjunct director and supply manager respectively,
Barcelona, Jan. 3,2011. Comparing the prices of water extraction and treatment illustrates the difference between
the stress on these two watercourses. Water from the Ter River costs 0.08€/m3 and the more polluted Llobregat
River is 0.246/m 3 . This data was obtained in personal communication with officials from the Catalan Water
Agency.
29. ACA, EL AGUA EN CATALUftA [WATER INCATALONIA] 18 (2008), http://aca-wcb.gencat.cat/aca/documents/ca/publicacions/aigua_a_catalunyaaiguaa catalunya cs.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (200 hm3 per year
are discharged from the Ter, while 160 hm3 are discharged from the Llobregat).
30. There are several dams in the two systems. In the Ter, we find the Sau (completed in 1962), Colomers
(1967), Susqueda (1968), and El Pastcral (1962). In the Llobregat, we find La Baells (1976), La Llosa dcl Cavall
(1998), Sant Pon (1954), and Sant Marti de Tous (1997). There are many differences among these dams and
reservoirs. For example, the Sau dam covers 572.8 hectares while the Sant Marti de Tous covers only fifteen
hectares. The dams and reservoirs are mainly owned by the Catalan Government through the ACA, except for
Susqueda and El Pasteral, which are owned by a hydroelectric company. In addition, in other rivers, there are
dams owned by industrial companies or irrigation communities. Data is available on the website of EL
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA,

ALIMENTACI6N

Y MEDIo

AMBIENTE [DEPARTMENT

OF AGRICULTURE,

http://sig.marm.es/snczi/visor.html?herramienta=EstadisticasPresas (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012); ACA, TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPACITY: INLAND BASINS, http://aca-web.gencat.cat/aca/appmanager/aca/aca?-nfpb-true&pageLabel=P1226354461208201575707 (last visited Apr. 3,
2012).
NUTRITION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT],
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when rainfall drops, the problem becomes more acute. The problem is likely to get worse,
given the expected impact of climate change in Mediterranean regions.
Barcelona, like many other cities all over the world, is not located in the most water
abundant area. In addition, Barcelona and Catalonia in general have suffered from the
same drivers of scarcity that regions all over the world face, making the deficit worse.
Those drivers are population growth and urban sprawl, which go hand-in-hand with
changes in consumption patterns. Barcelona's Metropolitan Area has increased from 3.5
million inhabitants to 4.5 million inhabitants in the last forty years. 31 Rather than population increasing in the main city, it has increased in the outer zones of the metropolitan area
where density is much lower.32 Urban sprawl is associated with more spacious houses with
small gardens or swimming pools. Those areas consume more than dense cities and town
33
in the metropolitan area and have driven the absolute increase in water consumption.
Furthermore, urban development planning has not always adequately taken into account
future water needs. As a consequence, nowadays, some cities are struggling for water because that is where population changes have concentrated. Water demands should be included in urban planning strategies. In some places, cities seem to have learned from past
mistakes and have started to integrate land use and water supplies. Californian legislatures
and courts have required developers to include in their plans water supplies ensuring future
reliability. 34 The deficit of the Internal Basins is estimated to be around 300-350 hm3 per
35
year.
Like in many other jurisdictions, while these changes took place, water allocation
did not vary substantially. The agricultural sector has been, and is, the main consumer of
water in many regions all over the world as a result of its historical relevance and the fact
that water is one of the main production inputs for irrigated agriculture. Globally, agriculture is responsible for 70% of all withdrawals of fresh water.36 This is a common pattern
in the distribution of water across uses in several jurisdictions. The agricultural sector uses
75% in Spain. 37 As in many other jurisdictions, the mismatch between this figure and the
contribution of agriculture into the gross domestic product 38 is usually criticized. Farmers
3 I. Un estudio afirma que el drea metropolitana de Barcelona esti llegando a Lleida y Tarragona [A study
concludes that Barcelona's metropolitan area extends to Tarragona and Lleida], EL PAlS, 8 June 2000 http://elpais.com/diario/2000/06/08/catalunya/960426452_850215.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
32. Josep Roca Cladera, Informe sobre Ievoluci6 de Ia poblaci6n de Barcelona i la seva drea metropolitanta
1996-2001: Conclusions [Report on the Evolution of the Population of Barcelona and its Metropolitan Area
1996-2001; Conclusions] (Universitat Politdnica de Catalunya 2002), http://www-cpsv.upe.es/documents/PoblacioBCN 2001 .pdf.
33. L drea metropolitana de Barcelona, la que mis aigua estalvia dEuropa [Barcelona's metropolitan drea,
the one which saves more water in Europe], EL PUNT, 28 July 2010, http://www.elpuntavui.cat/article/-/5For a general
socictat/200430-larea-metropolitana-de-barcelona-la-que-mes-aigua-estalvia-deuropa.htm.
explanation of the effects of Romeu et al., supra note 26, at 13.
34. ELLEN

HANAK,

WATER

FOR

GROWTH:

CALIFORNIA'S

NEW

FRONTIER

3,

32

(2005),

http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/repor/R705EHR.pdf (commenting and evaluating compliance of California
statutes requiring water supply assessments).
35. Proposta de resoluci6 transaccional entre la proposta n6m. 8 dcl Grup Parlamcntari Socialistes-Ciutadans
pcI Canvi i la proposta nim. 9 del Grup Parlamentari de Convergancia i Uni6 (Reg. 13309) 121 (Butlleti Oficial
del Parlament de Catalunya 121, 2000).
36. Coping with Water Scarcity: An Action Framework for Agriculture and Food, 38 FAO WATER REPORTS
ix (2012), http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3015e/i30l5e.pdf.
37. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Estadisticas e indicadores delagua, CIFRAS INE 4 (2008) (2005 data).
38. Agriculture represents 2.5% of the Spanish GDP. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
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are usually blamed for their inefficient use of water and the low price they are paying for
it, which is clearly at the root of the problem. This has translated into pressures towards
this sector; if water has to come from somewhere to quench urban and environmental
thirst, it has to be from agriculture. 39 Not only the balance between uses has changed, but
also new uses compete for the resource. Particularly, environmental protection awareness
has increased over the years, calling for non-consumptive uses of water. Stream flows have
been protected for the benefits of fish and wildlife and the enjoyment of human beings.
Structural scarcity is made worse when there is a long period of reduced natural
supply. The most recent drought episode in Catalonia was declared an emergency around
April 20074 0-just four months after the previous 2005-2006 drought period had officially
finished-and was declared to have ended on January 2009. 4 1 Barcelona's deficit became
blatant during this time. The newspapers were full of alarming news about an approaching
household water curtailment if it did not rain soon or some water was supplied from new
sources. 42 The reservoirs were at around 20% of their capacity. 43 The crisis ended thanks
to rain, but it is likely that similar water crises will arise again because of the area's water
deficit.
As the next section will explain, the options available to the Metropolitan Area to
tackle its structural deficit are similar to those available to water stressed regions around
the world. The measures will be discussed in relation to the 2007-2008 drought crisis too.
In addition to purely demand side or supply side measures, the analysis will finish with
the roles that water markets could have played in this drought management.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp.html
(last visited Feb. 4,
2016). Agriculture represents slightly less than 2% of California's Gross State Product (GSP). Mechel Paggi,
CaliforniaAgriculture's Role in the Economy and Water Use Characteristics,CALIFORNIA WATER (2011),
http://www.californiawater.org/cwi/docs/AWUEconomics.pdf(last visited Mar. 27, 2016). For a statement on
the pressure and critique on the agricultural sector in Spain, see JOSEFINA MAESTU ET AL, EL AGUA EN LA
ECONOMiA ESPAF4OLA: SITUACI6N Y PERSPECTIVAS 119-23 (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 2007),
http://www.fnca.cu/bibliotcca-del-agua/directorio/filc/685-1306271426-cl-agua-en-la-economia-espanola.
See
Agricultural Water Use, CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/waterusccfficiency/agricultural
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (emphasizing the pressure on agriculture to use water efficiently as a result of the
growth of other demands in California).
39. Glennon, Water Scarcity, supra note 1, at 1888 ("Let's be clear about one thing: we are talking about
transfers from rural farming areas to cities. Most of the water that will sustain the expected 15 million additional
Californians is going to come from agriculture. It has to."). A 10% improvement in agricultural water use may
be enough to satisfy urban demand, though climate change may make a greater improvement necessary. PETER
FACTBOOK,

ROGERS & SUSAN LEAL, RUNNING OUT OF WATER: THE LOOMING CRISIS AND SOLUTIONS TO CONSERVE OUR

MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE 84 (2010).
40. Decret 84/2007, dc 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesures excepcionals i d'emerg~ncia en relaci6 amb la
utilitzaci6 dels recursos hidrics [Decree 84/2007, April 3, Adopting Exceptional and Emergency Measures in
Relation to the Use of Hydroresources] (DOGC 4860, 2007) (Spain).
41. Decret 5/2009, de 13 de gener, pe qual es deroga el Decret 84/2007, de 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesures
excepcionals i d'emergincia en relaci6 amb la utilitzaci6 de recursos hidrics [Decree 5/2009, Jan. 13, Repealing
the Decree Adopting Exceptional and Emergency Measures in Relation to the Use of Hydroresources] (DOGC
5298, 2009) (Catalunya).
42. Guerradel agua ante la sequia catalana[Water war and the Catalan drought], EL PALS, Mar. 31, 2008.
43. Anna Ribas i Palom & David Sauri, 2008 L'Any de la Sequera (2008, The Year of the Drought),
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IV. SOLUTIONS TO STRUCTURAL DEFICIT AND PERIODICAL DROUGHT

A.

Demand Solutions

On the demand side, there are several measures of different natures that could be
taken. Economic incentives, in particular price increases, are solutions favored by economists. Price increases translate into demand reductions. In fact, the ACA argues that while
price increases have reduced consumption, the change in consumption habits" and other
factors, such as population growth, have outweighed the savings achieved in absolute
terms. An alternative to price raises are soft measures that have few short-term effects but
may have long-term benefits. An example of this type of measure is the public educational
45
campaigns about efficient water use in our homes, which are common in Catalonia. Sim46
ilarly, the awareness of the water problems can translate into a decrease in consumption.
As result of the several drought periods during the 2000s, Barcelona consumption decreased to 110 liters per person per day. 47 This has not been enough to solve the problems
and implies that further reductions cannot be expected. 48 Ninety liters per person/ per year
is the threshold point that the World Health Organization (WHO) established as the limit
below which some sanitary problems may appear. 49 It must be highlighted that the current
average consumption level is quite an achievement. For example, the 2009 New York City
50
consumption per inhabitant is around 476 liters.
Amidst a drought, the government adopts mainly short-term demand measures, beyond the voluntary reduction by household users, corresponding to the given need for immediate relief. On April 3, 2007, the Catalan Government adopted exceptional and emergency measures in relation to the use of water resources. 5' The measures listed in this
52
Emergency Decree (Decree) were tiered according to the seriousness of the situation,

44. Romeu et al., supra note 26, at 4 (citing ACA, L'Ag~ncia i ]a sequera [The Agency and the Drought]
(2006)).
45. Estalvi d'aigua [Water savings], GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www.gencat.cat/web/multime-

dia/cat/cstalviaigua/indcx.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); Guerradel agua ante la sequia catalana, EL PALS,
http://elpais.com/diario/2008/03/3l/espana/I206914401_850215.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
The campaigns put forward during the 2007-08 drought can be found at ACA, Campanyes de sensibilitzaci6 Sequera 2007-2008 [2007-2008 Drought Public Awareness Campaigns], GENERALITAT DE
CATALUNYA http://aca-web.gencat.cat/aca/sequcra/ca/campanyes-sensibilitzacio.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
46. Water savings, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Joan Armengol & Josep DoIz, L 'abastamentd'aiguaa Catalunya i la seva garantia, [Waterprovision in
Cataloniaand its guarantee],93-94 NOTA D'ECONOMIA 127, 133 (2009), http://economia.gencat.cat/web/.contcnt/documents/articlcs/arxius/1_abastamcntd aiguaacatalunyailasevagarantia.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
50.

NEW

YORK

CITY

GOVERNMENT,

HISTORY

OF

DROUGHT

AND

WATER

CONSUMPTION,

http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/drinking water/droughthist.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
51. Decret 84/2007, de 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesurcs excepcionals i d'emerg~ncia en relaci6 amb la utilitzaci6 dels recursos hidrics (Catalunya).
52. Id. There were three main scenarios. The level one scenario employs measures which will ensure that
water will be available in the medium-term. The level two scenario establishes tighter measures to guarantee
domestic uses in the short-term. The level three scenario, or emergency scenario, is the most serious one and
entails extraordinary and serious restrictions, including restrictions to household consumptions (for example,
water could have been unavailable at nights). For example, the Ter-Llobregat system enters into a level I scenario
when the level of reservoirs drops below 33 percent. The center will enter into a level two scenario if the stored
water is below 23% of reservoir capacity. If the reservoir drops to below 20%, then the systems enters the emergency scenario. The Decree itself entailed the declaration of a level I scenario. Art 2 of the Decree 84/2007
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and the seriousness is measured according to the amount of water in the reservoirs. Here
the measures are going to be analyzed according to whether they are targeting the demand
or the supply side.
Diverse obligations were imposed on water utility companies, municipalities, households, farmers, and industries by this Decree. 53 The principal measures implemented were
restrictions on irrigation. 54 The underlying assumption seemed to be that the water marginal value is lower in agriculture than in domestic or industrial uses. The Decree established the maximum amount of water that can be taken from the river for irrigation purposes, thereby curtailing the farmers' permits. 55 The amount of water available for crops
decreased depending on the seriousness of the drought situation. For example, initially the
restriction set less water available for all the crops, but if drought aggravated, restrictions
were established at the level of survival for perennial crops, like fruit trees, which have
high fixed costs. 56 At that point, there was no allocation for less valuable crops. Almost
any measure or limitation adopted-for example, restrictions on irrigation rights-were
not compensable, except the ones that were a direct takings. 57 However, it must be noted
that the lack of direct compensation for the restriction on irrigation rights was somehow
cancelled out by the direct subsidies that farmers received for the loss of crops due to
58
drought.
59
Water use by municipalities were also restricted starting from level 1 scenarios.
They could not use water of quality suitable for human consumption for uses other than
that, like irrigating public parks.60 This measure can have long term effects because systems for reusing water for irrigation of public areas or fountains could create permanent
61
water savings-as it has been the case in the city of Barcelona.
defines the scenarios and the rest of the provisions establish the specific restrictions and the specific triggers for
each basin. Decret 84/2007, Art. 2, de 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesures excepcionals i d'emergncia en relaci6
amb la utilitzaci6 dels recursos hidrics (Catalunya).
There are examples not too far away, like Sevilla, where household water suffered severe restrictions from
1992 to 1996; there were periods where water was unavailable for up to ten hours per day. See Antonio M. Rico
Amor6s, Sequiasy Abastecimiento de Agua en Espafa [Droughtsand Water Distributionin Spain], 37 BOLETiN
OFICIAL DE LA AGE 137, 170 (2004).
53. Decret 84/2007, de 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesures exccpcionals i d'emergrncia en rclaci6 amb la utilitzaci6 dels recursos hidrics (Catalunya).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For the drought period of 2007-2008, the subsidies have essentially become loans offered by a public
institution at lower interest rates. For example, the farmers growing flowers received loans to distribute the losses
caused by the drought over several years. In addition, given the current financial crisis, they received subsidies
to cover these already favorable loans, see ORDRE AAR/433/20 10, de 6 de setembre, per la qual es convoquen
cls ajuts per bonificar els costos financers dels prdstecs per la sequera de 2008 als titulars d'explotacions agrries
de flor i planta ornamental [Order AAR/443/2010, Sept. 6, announcing the call for subsidies for owners of flower
and decorative plant farms in order to pay for the financial costs of loans related to the 2008 drought], (DOGC
5713, 2010).
59. Ajuntament de Barcelona, L 'Ajuntamentpresenta les seves mesures per lluitarcontra la sequera [Barcelona City Council, The City Council announces its measures tofight against drought], BARCELONA, Jan. 14,
2008, http://wl I0.bcn.cat/fitxers/prcmsa/070114rdpplasequera.285.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
60. Id.
61. For a list of measures taken during the 2007-2008 drought, Ajuntament de Barcelona, L Ajuntament
presentales seves mesures per lluitarcontra la sequera [Barcelona City Council, The City Council announces
its measures to fight against drought], BARCELONA, Jan. 14, 2008, http://w1l0.bcn.cat/fitxers/premsa/070114rdpplasequera.285.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). For the current environmental management
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Restrictions on household consumption were the last resort, they would have only
been adopted in emergency scenarios. But local authorities-which are the level of government responsible for urban water supply-are empowered by the Decree to adopt immediate measures to ensure an efficient use of water.62 For example, they could restrictively regulate the irrigation of private gardens, patios, or lawns. 63 In fact, the Catalan
government conditioned on the adoption of these measures the funding for infrastructure
projects to reduce the burden on current local, water supplies or to increase water supplies
64 In addition, a mandate to plan and implement measures to reduce water stress was imposed on water utility companies supplying areas of more than 20,000 inhabitants. For
example, Aigiies de Barcelona, in Barcelona, decided to improve the conveyance infrastructure by reducing leaks and reducing water pressure, which reduces consumption and
66
conveyance losses. 65 Thus achieving a 2% reduction in the volume of water used. As
shall be seen, the curtailments established and the shielding of domestic uses prevents the
market from fulfilling a similar reallocation where every user faces the real cost of the
water.
B. Supply Solutions
Water supply is generally considered fairly inelastic given the high costs of "producing" new water. The traditional solution for increasing supply has been to build dams
to smooth the availability of water across the year. But this is no longer an option in Catalonia because of the number of dams already present in both internal river systems and
the high political, economic, and environmental costs of building new dams. Water supply
could, however, be increased in several other ways in Catalonia. First, without resorting
to new sources of water, water availability could be increased by improving existing infrastructure in order to reduce transportation losses. For example, in Barcelona, 25% of
the water that enters into the system is not billed, 67 and in Badalona, a city in the Metro68
politan Area, a pipe lost more than 9,000 liters of water per hour for weeks.
Second, even though groundwater is already a source for Barcelona, more aquifers
could be utilized if they were restored, properly managed, and sometimes cleaned.

of Barcelona's public spaces, Ajuntament de Barcelona, Green Spaces, Environmental Management,
http://w I10.bcn.cat/portal/site/McdiAmbient (choose "English," follow "green spaces," then "Parks and gardens
of Barcelona," and then "Environmental Management").
62. Deeret 84/2007, art. 5, de 3 d'abril, d'adopci6 de mesures excepcionals i d'emerg~ncia en relaci6 amb la
utilitzaci6 dels recursos hidrics (Catalunya).
63. Id. art. 14.3.
64. Id. art. 14.5.
65. loanna Livaniou, Evaluating Asset Management Strategies of Water Cycle Systems Under Difference
Socio-Technical Contexts (Nov. 14, 2014) (unpublished master's thesis, Delft University of Technology),
http://www.citg.tudelft.nl/fileadmin/Faculteit/CiTG/Gezondheidstechniek/doc/Afstudeerrappor_.pdf.
tcn/Livaniou Evaluating AssetManagement Strategies
at 21.
66. Id.
67. See SALVADOR RUEDA, BARCELONA, CIUTAT MEDITERRANIA, COMPACTA I COMPLEXA. UNA VIS1O DE
FUTUR MtS SOSTENIBLE [BARCELONA, MEDITERRANEAN CITY, COMPACT AND COMPLEX] 60 (2002) (This percentage includes water lost due to aging infrastructure-estimated to amount between eight and ten percentillegal uses, bulk agreements, etc.).
68. Una tuberia rota pierde 216.000 litrosde agua aldia a supasoporBadalona, ABC NACIONAL, Feb. 28,
2008, http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-27-02-2008/abc/Nacional/una-tuberia-rota-pierdc-216000-litrosde-agua-al-dia-a-su-paso-por-badalona 1641682087452.html.
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Third, water reuse can be a source of water for certain uses. Recycling sewage water
is common for uses other than urban household consumption, but there are also interesting
experiments of waste water recycled for human consumption in Singapore and in Orange
3
County. 69 However, Catalonia is still behind. It treats huge amounts of water (700 hm )70
but it reuses a tiny percentage (51 hm 3 in 2008).71 Recycled water could be a source of
water for irrigation. It is important to note that irrigators are quite reluctant to accept this
water even though water is a reused asset per se.
Fourth, desalination production can be augmented to satisfy current deficits, but its
economic and environmental costs are very expensive. Desalination keeps alive the idea
that water is infinite. As a response to the drought, new desalination plants were built or
expanded, but none of them solved the immediate crisis. In late 2009, production capacity
of desalinated plants reached 80 hm3 .72 Nonetheless, in wet years, that amount is far from
reach because water from desalination is expensive. 73 Two more plants were planned but
74
never built.
Fifth, water could be transferred from other areas, but transporting water is expensive because it requires either infrastructure or tankers. For example, a transfer from the
Rh6ne River (France) to Barcelona has been perennially discussed because this plentiful
river does not suffer the same climatological stressors as the Catalan ones. Interbasin water
transfers, whether they have an international component or not, are always contentious
because they are environmentally and economically costly and politically controversial.
The situation became harsher in 2008, given the negligible precipitations that the area received during 2007. 75 In April of 2008, the reservoirs were at 20.14% of their capacity.
The domestic restrictions were close. If the stored water dropped below 20% of reservoir
capacity, households will suffer restrictions. These were expected for October 2008 at the
latest. At that time, a transfer from the Segre River, which is part of the Ebro Basin, was
debated to alleviate the situation. 76 The connection between the Ebro Basin and the Internal

69. ROGERS & LEAL, supra note 39, at 28-36.
70. ACA, https://aca-web.gencat.cat (follow "English"; then follow "Plans and programmes"; then follow

"Planning"; follow "Reuse in Catalonia").
71. Reuse,
ACA,
http://aca-web.gencat.cat/aca/appmanagcr/aca/aca?_nfpb-truc&
ageLabel=P1206854461208200613421&profileLocale=cn (follow chart "Evolution of volume of water reused by
use").

72. See ACA, Dessalinitzadoradel Prat(follow "English"; then follow "Action"; then follow "Desalination
Plants"; then follow "Prat Desalination Plant").
The capacity of the Tordera Desalination Plant was enlarged, and the Llobregat Desalination plant was inaugurated in 2009. These are the amounts they can produce, but actual production is adjusted according to the availability of traditional sources of water. See La dessalinitzadora de la Tordera, ACA, http://aca-wcb.gencat.cat/aca/appmanager/aca/aca?_nfpb=truc&_pageLabel=P18400839711246274517685& nfls=false (follow
Tordero desalination plant).
73. Els embassaments del Sistema Ter Llobregat reserven aigua per 6 memos per abastament, regiusos ambientals,
LA
VANGUARDIA
(Oct.
30,
2014),
http://www.lavanguardia.com/Iocal/barcelona/20141030/54418735440/cls-embassaments-del-sistema-ter-Ilobregat-reserven-aigua-pcr-6-mesos-perabastament-reg-i-usos.html.
74. Chris Fife-Schaw, Strategiesfor Addressing Water Shortages, TECHNEAU 18 (Dec. 2010).
75. Since February 2008, the Ter and Llobregat systems were at level 2 exceptionality, see ACA, MEMORIA
DE LA SEQUERA DEL 2007-2008 (REPORT ON THE 2007-2008 DROUGHT) 63 (2008), http://aca-

wcb.gcncat.cat/aca/documents/ca/publicacions/mcmoria2008/memoria aea_2008_ebook/index.html#/61 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012).
76. Amau Urgell, Transvasamentde la Conca Alta del Segre a I 'drea metropolitan de Barcelona [Transfer
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Basins could be easily built since the headwaters of the Llobregat River and the Segre
River are close to one another. It also could have benefited from the Cadi tunnel, a road
tunnel built in 1984 that connects the two areas. Apart from the short term relief these
exchanges would have provided-probably thanks to water coming from fallowed
fields-this project could have had good future prospects. Water could have been freed by
improving irrigation techniques and sold by farmers to the Metropolitan Area municipalities. Careful monitoring to avoid externalities would have been needed since irrigation
occurs down the river, and the catchment point that provides water for Barcelona would
have occurred in the headwaters. In addition, water infrastructure could have been used
bi-directionally, and thus, farmers could have been water receivers. Since this is so, an
even more innovative solution could have been implemented, such as substituting irrigation water for reused water, and thus freeing up the clean irrigation water to go to Barcelona. However, the Segre option was disfavored by farmers, local authorities, and, most
importantly, the central government, whose approval was needed for any infrastructure
work connecting an interstate basin. 77 The central government never approved the Segre
connection and subsequent transfer.
The harsh situation during the Spring of 2008 compelled the Spanish central government to pass a Real Decreto-Ley, 78 a type of act reserved for extraordinary situations,
which added to the measures taken by the Catalan Government. Even though the Segre
transfer had been discarded, this Spanish act authorized the connection of Barcelona with
Tarragona, a town in the south of Catalonia that receives water from the Ebro River. Once
built, this connection would have allowed a water transfer from the agricultural area part
79
of the Ebro system to the Internal Basins.
The connection entailed a transfer pipe, which was not a mammoth project. It was
relatively cheap to install and it did not have a huge environmental impact. The project
was designed to be installed in the median of the highway that unites Barcelona with Tarragona (AP-7). Even though a pipe can be useful to send water either way, it seemed clear
who would be the recipient anytime: the Metropolitan Region. To calm the protests from
the Tarragona region, it was decided that the structure would be temporary.80 The expected

from the Upper Segre River Basin to the Metropolitan Area], TERRITORI, http://territori.scot.cat/cat/notices/2008/12/transvasament de la conca alta del_segre a I Area metropolitana de barcelona_2008_172.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
77. The concept of basin varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. According to the European Water Framework Directive and the Spanish legislation, a basin includes a river which flows into the sea and all its tributaries.
Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000: establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, 22.12.2000 OFFICIAL J. EUROPEAN CMTYS. 1, 6; CWA,

art. 16 [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2001], de 20 de julio, pot cl quc se aprueba el texto refundido de ]a Ley de
Aguas (B.O.E. 2001, 176). According to this definition, the Yellowstone River would not be considered an independent basin, and instead it would be managed as part of the Missouri River basin; but in the United States
these rivers are managed separately.
78. Real Decreto-ley 3/2008, de 21 de abril, de medidas excepcionales y urgentes para garantizar el abastecimiento de poblaciones afectadas por la sequfa en la provincia de Barcelona [Royal Decree-Act 3/2008, Apr.
21, of exceptional and urgent measures to guarantee the provision to localities affected by the drought in the
Barcelona's province] (B.O.E. 97, 2008) (Spain).
79. Id.
80. ERC ird a la manifestaci6n contra el minitrasvase acordado por los Gobiernos central y cataldn [ERC
will go to the demonstration against the minitransfer agreed by the central and Catalan governments], EL PAIS,
Apr. 21, 2008, http://elpais.com/elpais/2008/04/21/actualidad/1208765837_850215.html.

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:731

cost was 180 million euros, and its installation was expected to be completed within two
months.8 1
It was a very controversial project from the beginning. Some years before, the Popular Party, while governing in the central government, put forward a National Hydrologic
Plan that included a transfer of 190hm 3 per year from the Ebro River to the internal basins
of Catalonia.8 2 The Socialist government later partly repealed the plan in fulfillment of one
of its electoral promises. This smaller transfer project would have conveyed only forty hm3
per year, and this water was part of the allocation from the Ebro that Tarragona was not
consuming. There had been a huge opposition to the initial Ebro transfer, which the Socialist party had used as an electoral platform. The Socialist Party held many positions in
the government when the Tarragona connection was being debated. Public discontent,
channeled through the organizations that opposed the previous plan, targeted the Socialist
central government, the Socialist Party, and other left-wing parties in Catalonia because
they allowed this smaller connection after having opposed the previous one. 83 Detractors
feared that once the faucet opened, there would be no way to stop Barcelona from receiving
as much water as it wished given its capital relevance and to the detriment of southern
rural and small urban areas and the environment. 84 Given the opposition to the project, it
was not even called a transfer in order to circumvent the stigma it had tied to it. Instead, it
was called catchment, a less loaded word.
While the Ebro project was in the early stages, given the immediacy of the crisis,
water started being shipped to Barcelona by boat from Tarragona, which had a surplus of
groundwater, to Marseille and the Provence Canal in France. The ships were expected to
carry around 1.66 hm3 per month, which would have fulfilled around 6% of the demand
in the Metropolitan Area while the drought period lasted. This was an incredibly expensive
source, even though transportation was cheaper thanks to the harbor fee waiver granted by
81. Id.
82. Ley 10/2001, de 5 dc julio, del Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional (Act 10/2001, July 5, National Hydrologic
Plan) (B.O.E. 61, 2001) (Spain). The National Hydrological Plan was passed by the Spanish Legislature in

2001. Its provisions regarding transfers to the Catalan Internal basins and the Segura and Jucar Basins were
particularly polemic with plenty of public opposition. For example, the "Plataforma per la Defensa de l'Ebre"
an association for the defense of the Ebre River which was started by citizens of the area near its delta-organized
a demonstration on September 9, 2001 in front of the European Institutions in Brussels. For a report on the
different protests, see Instituto Aragonds del Agua, Cr6nica de la lucha contra el trasvase (Report on the struggle
against the transfer), http://www.aragon.es/DepartamentosOrganismosPublicos/Organismos/InstitutoAragonesAgua/AreasTematicas/PlanHidrologicoNaciona (follow "Cr6nica de la lucha contra el trasvase") (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).

The Socialist Party was against these transfers and promised to derogate them if it won the election. After
winning the 2004 election, it passed the Ley 11/2005, de 22 dejunio, por la quc se modifica la Ley 10/2001, de
5 dejulio, del Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional [Act 11/2005, June 22, modifying Act 10/2001, July 5, of the National

Hydrologic Plan] (B.O.E. 149 23.07.2005), which repeals these transfers, arguing that their negative effects had
been undervalued.
83. Un trasvase politicamente correcto [A politically correct transfer], ABC (Mar. 18, 2008)
http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico- I 8-03-2008/abc/Sociedad/un-trasvase-politicamente-correcto 1641729666056.html. For the critique of the left-wing parties, see Corbacho i CiUcoincideixenen criticar
elpaper d'ERC davant el minitransvasamentde l'Ebre [CorbachoI CIUagree in theircritique ofERC 'sposition
in relation to the Ebro 's mini-transfer], DIARI DE GIRONA (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.diaridegirona.cat/catalu-

nya/2008/04/23/corbacho-ciu-coincideixen-criticar-paperdrc-davant-minitransvasament-lebre/261609.html.
84. For an account on the opposition to the smaller transfer, see Amau Ugell, Transvasament del Consorci
d'Aigiies de Tarragonaa 1'A4rea Metropolitanade Barcelona[Transferfrom the Tarragona'sWater Consortium

to the Barcelona MetropolitanArea], Observatori de projectes i debats territorials a Catalunya, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://territori.scot.cat/cat/viewer.php?IDN= 174 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
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the Spanish central government. Cost of water shipped by boat was above 13E/m 3 , 85 while
86

3
water from the Ter river cost only 0.08C/m .

The Ebro transfer was never completed. Rains in late April and early May of 2008
moved the risk of household curtailments further away. On June 5th, the Spanish Govern87
ment suspended the Decree-Act that allowed the connection.
C. Water Markets, the Missing Piece
Finally, there is the option of pursuing policies that affect both supply and demand:
water markets. Those were the missing pieces of the response to the 2007-2008 drought in
Catalonia.
By water markets, Iconsider any mechanism, temporary or permanent, which allows
users with different marginal values to transfer the right to use water. The most common
experiences are water banks, environmental water accounts, and contracts between private
parties. Each of them requires different roles from the government. For example, in a water
bank, the administrative agency responsible plays the role of a broker, which may imply
some backup functions necessary at early stages of market development since parties
might be unfamiliar with water transactions. But even if the market consisted only of private contracts, government would have to play certain roles, such as reviewing transactions for externalities, given the potential failures present in water markets. The lack of
governmental spur might be the reason why water markets have not been a useful tool in
Spain even though they are legally feasible.
The purpose of water markets are to bring water from water-abundant to waterscarce areas by reducing water demand from low value uses, such as agriculture, and supplying that water to higher-value users, such as urban users. If markets existed, the drought
situations should not become as harsh as they are nowadays in regimes like the Spanish
one, where the agency responsible for water allocation decides which categories of rights
to curtail, without paying attention to the specific marginal values of their right holders. If
users could buy, sell, or lease their rights, the expected result is that those who value the
water most will be the primary ones who use it, thus reducing the potential losses from a
drought. Furthermore, given that increasing the water supply is not a solution in addressing
the scarcity problem in the majority of region, markets could provide a way to reallocate

3
85. The amount of water shipped per month was expected to be 1,660,000 m , and the expected monthly cost
22 million euros. See GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, Arriba el primer vaixell amb aigua potable al port de
Barcelona [The First Ship With Drinking Water Arrives to Barcelona's Port], http://www20.geneat.cat/docs/Sala%20de%20Premsa/Documents/Arxius/mah premsa.notaPrcmsa.63.11210663808665.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012).
86. Personal communication with officials from the Catalan Water Agency.
87. Resoluci6n de 6 de junio de 2008, de la Secretaria de Estado de Mcdio Rural y Agua, por la que se publica
cl Acuerdo del Consejo de Ministros de 6 de junio de 2008, por cl que se declara la concurrencia de la causa de
cese de la vigencia del Real Decreto-lcy 3/2008, de 21 dc abril, de medidas excepcionales y urgente para garantizar el abastecimiento de poblaciones afectadas por la sequla en la provincia de Barcelona [Resolution, June 6,
2008, of the Secretary of State for Rural Water, which publishes the Agreement of the Council of Ministers of
June 6, 2008, declaring the concurrence of the cause of cessation of the force of Royal Decree-Law 3/2008, April
21, of exceptional and urgent measures to ensure supplies of drought-affected populations in the province of
Barcelona] (B.O.E. 138, 2008).
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water. The majority of regions are already over allocated and new sources, such as desalination, are too expensive. But markets would provide a far more flexible system, without
political distortion.
Markets would provide farmers with the incentives to adopt efficient irrigation techniques or to adjust their crop types, and would allow users to shield their risks of curtailment. Markets, thus, are both a demand side measure and a supply side one, ensuring that
water flows to those who value it the most. Demand in the agricultural sector would decrease because the benefit from using the water to irrigate is lower than the benefit they
will obtain from selling it. Given that they reduce demand, any supply available for other
users would increase because the water rights that irrigators hold are for lease or sale.
These mechanisms should be less controversial than mandated transfers since mandated
transfers decrease supply in the region of origin that could translate into environmental
problems and restrictions for the right holders during future droughts. If markets existed,
the right holders of these regions could decide whether to lease or sell water and benefit
from it. Similarly, administrative mandated cuts assume uses are more or less valuable and
reduce their permits, but such an assessment by the administration is likely to be less precise than decentralized private parties decision when facing the real cost of water. Farmers
could choose to irrigate or sell it to urban utilities. Urban utilities may decide to reduce
their customers' demands by increasing the price, adopting other measures, or buying the
water from farmers. However, such a scenario will not likely be realized in Spain because
water market regulation is flawed, as the next subsection will demonstrate by using California as a benchmark. Emergency measures further hinder water markets.
1. Water Markets Regulation in Spain: A Bad Disciple of California
Water rights in Spain were transferable under the 1985 Water Act, but transactions
were few since the procedure was so cumbersome, taking up to eighteen months to get an
approval of the transfer between two private parties. 88 In 1999, an overhaul of Spanish
water regulation was introduced. Two different types of exchanges were allowed: first,
leasing contracts-private parties could enter into lease contracts for water use permits89and second, exchanges within the framework of a water bank allowing them to sell or lease
these to other users. A water bank is an administratively-run clearinghouse where the
agency establishes the buying and selling price and issues permits for holders to sell or
lease their water use rights to the bank. 90 The drought period in the early 90s was a precursor of this regulation, but as will be explained in the next section, it was not enough to
prevent the harsher effects of the mid 2000s drought or to resolve the structural problem.91
88. Jos6 Luis Moreu Ballonga, Una explicacinjuridicasobre el Mercadodel agua [A legal explanation of
the
Water
Market],
EL PAlS
(May
31,
1999),
http://elpais.com/diario/l999/05/31/sociedad/928101610 850215.html.
89. CWA, arts. 67-70 [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2001], de 20 de julio, por clque se aprueba cltexto refundido de la Ley de Aguas (B.O.E. 2001, 176).
90. Id. art. 71.
91. Ley 1999/46 (B.O.E. 1999, 298), preamble:
En este sentido, la experieneia de la intensisima sequia, padecida por nuestro pais en los primeros afios de la
drcada final de este siglo, impone la bdisqueda de solueiones altemativas, que, con independencia de la mejor
reasignaci6n de los recursos disponibles, a travds de mecanismos de planificaci6n, permitan, de un lado, incrementar ]a producci6n de agua mediante la utilizaci6n de nuevas tecnologias, otorgando rango legal al rdgimen
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Since this article aims to offer lessons beyond Catalonia for the West of the U.S., it
is important to note the Californian experience during the 1999 political debate concerning
the bill to amend the 1985 Water Act.92 Scholars have recognized that California provides
a good comparison to Mediterranean jurisdictions. Inhis analysis of the 1991 California
Bank, Howitt acknowledges the similarities between Mediterranean regions and the
"Golden State":
Mediterranean water economies are characterized by the same problems
and climate that face California, namely spatial and temporal inequalities
of water allocation.
Throughout the Mediterranean region urban and environmental water
demands continue to grow, while agricultural water users wish to retain
the cheaper water that was developed earlier. Nowhere is this problem
more acute than in the economy of the State of California, USA, which
in terms of its water uses, climate and conflicts has close parallels to
Mediterranean countries.

93

Since Spain is an example of a Mediterranean jurisdiction, this quotation supports
the meaningfulness of the comparison chosen here. In fact, drawing on similar characteristics, Arroyo and Naredo, two Spanish scholars, offered in their 1997 book a descriptive
comparison of Californian and Spanish water policy,94 including its markets.
When debating water markets in the Spanish Congress, opposing parties in Spain
treated the Californian experience strategically. The Socialist Party, in the opposition at
the time of the reform, defended water banks based on the Californian experience, but
explicitly opposed markets.95 In contrast, Mr. Blanco, the right wing party Water Secretary, regarded California as a successful experience-but his reform went beyond water
banks, which many seemed to consider the only transfer mechanism available in California. 96 The potential negative effects are attenuated because the user can only transfer the
average volume that was used during the last five years.
juridico de los procedimientos dc desalaci6n o de reutilizaci6n, de otro, potenciar ]a eficiencia en clempleo del
agua para lo que es necesario larequerida flcxibilizaci6n del actual rdgimen concesional a travrs de laintroducci6n del nuevo contrato de ccsi6n dc derechos al uso delagua, que permitiii optimizar socialmente los usos de
un recurso tan escaso. [In this sense, the experience of the intense drought suffered by our country in the early
years of the final decade of this century, calls for the search of new alternative solutions, which, regardless of the
best reallocation of available resources through planning mechanisms. These new solutions should, on the one
had, increase water production using new technologies, granting legal status to legal procedures desalination or
reuse, and, on the other, enhance efficiency in water use given the flexibility needed under the current concession
regime through the introduction of the new contract for the transfer of rights to use water, which will optimize
socially uses of such scarce resource].
92. See Comisi6n de Medio Ambiente, Comisirn de Medio Ambiente, Session No. 38 (1999) (Diario de
Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados 1999, 723).
93. Richard E. Howitt, EmpiricalAnalysis of Water Market Institutions: The 1991 CaliforniaWater Market,
16 RES. & ENERGY EcON. 357, 358 (1994).
94. PEDRO ARROJO & JOst MANUEL NAREDO, LA GESTION DEL AGUA EN ESPARlA Y CALIFORNIA (1997).

95. El PSOE plantearti hoy al Gobierno su rechazo a los mercados de agua, EL PAlS (Mar. 15, 1999),
http://elpais.com/diario/1999/03/I5/sociedad/921452410_850215.html.
96. Juan Femandez-Cuesta, El Mercado del Agua queda bajo control con un precio mdximo de 60 pesetas
por metro citbico, ABC 86 ("Hay experimentos de mercados de agua que han funcionado muy mal en el mundo,
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A rough estimate of transactions from to 2000 to 2009 is that only 296,521.785 acrefeet were transferred. 97 This is less of 1% of water used in a year and far below what is
transferred in California any given year. 98 These figures suggest that water markets have
not been very active, and activity is a good proxy for success in this case.99 Three important
considerations regarding the leases must be noted because they partially explain why those
tools were not widely used in Spain.
First, water lease contracts must respect the legal ranking of uses, that is, water
should be leased to users ranked at a same or higher level. In relation to this first point, it
is important to highlight that leases only operate between sellers and buyers who are already users.100
The default ranking, which is the same as that established in the 1985 Water Act, is
set in Article 59 of the Consolidated Water Act, but the River Basin Plans can modify it.101
The default ranking is as follows: domestic users and small industry connected to the municipal water net; agriculture; hydroelectric or other electric power producers; industry;
fish farms; recreation; navigation. This ranking purportedly expresses the public interest.102 But, the ranking seems to be more a proxy of the social valuation of water, probably
lagging behind current times, anchored in the times when we were an agricultural society.
Another hypothesis is that the relative abstract inelasticity of demand of the different uses
which assumes that domestic consumers and farmers cannot do without water. This requirement of respecting the ranking in water transactions should not be an obstacle in times
of drought since the idea behind water exchanges is that farmers could save water or fallow
their fields because they either can increase their efficiency or lose the annual crop. They
can sell it to other farmers growing higher value crops or to urban water suppliers selling
water to domestic users, which are always at the top of the ranking. In addition, the ranking
requirement can be waived in certain emergency scenarios.

como en Chile, y otros que han dado juego, como en California." ["There are water market experiences which
have not worked well, like in Chile, and others that did, like in California".]).
97. Data on file with the author. Jesrs Yague-C6rdova, Experiencia de los instrumentosde mercado en Espaha [Experience ofthe MBI in Spain], EXPO ZARAGOZA (2008), https://www.zaragoza.es/contenidos/medioambiente/cajaAzul/37S 12-P 1-JesusYagueCordovaACC.pdf.
98. The annual average of the committed water amount from 1991 to 2000 is 1,843,098 acre-feet in California. Database, California Water Transfer Records, BREN SCH. ENVTL. SCI. & MGM'T,
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water-transfers.htm.
99. This is a traditional proxy in the literature on water markets. See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Water Markets
In The West: Prices, Trading, And Contractual Forms, 39 NAT'L BUREAU ECON., working Paper 130002,
(2007); Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 MICH. J. L. REFORM
1021, 1031-1035 (2007) (attempting to explain the difference between the trading activity of different states
using their institutional differences); Jedidiah Brewer et al., Law and the New Institutional Economics: Water
Markets and Legal Change in California, 1987-2005, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 183 (2008) (legal changes are
included here as explanatory variables).
100. Vanessa Casado Pdrez, Missing Water Markets, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 217 (2015)
101. For example, in the River Basin Plan of the Segura River Basin industry takes precedence over electric
power production. Segura River Water Plan, Normative Section.Another example of a plan that has slightly
changed the order is the Miflo-Sil River Basin Plan where section 2.1.3.1. establishes the following precedence:
1) domestic; 2) fanning not irrigation; 3) industry with low water consumption; 4) irrigation; 5) industrial uses;
6) electric energy uses. Mifio Sil Plan, Normative Section (1998).
102. Juan Fernandez-Cuesta, El Mercado del Agua queda bajo control con un precio mcximo de 60 pesetas
por metro cfibico [Water Market Stays Under Control with Maximum Price of 60 Pesetasper Cubic Meter], ABC
(May 3, 1999), http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hcmerotcca/madrid/abc/1999/05/03/086.html.
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Even though it seems to be less of a deterrent in practice because we assume water
will be coming from the agricultural sector, the regulation is still far from optimal. The
rank decided by the agency is a very rough proxy for marginal value since there might be
an industry whose marginal value is higher for the extra twenty liters of water per day it
needs to meet a peak in production and its water demand is very inelastic. However, industry use is ranked lower than agricultural use; thus, industry cannot lease from a farmer.
Furthermore, new users cannot buy water from current users. This means that new entrants
have to apply for new permits even though streams may be over-allocated. This approach
is highly different from California's private transactions. Not only do rank of order limitations not exist, but also, Senate Bill 610 and Senate Bill 221 of 2001 establish that new
urban developments have to ensure that water is available for the next twenty years and
03
transfers are among the sources they can rely on to prove that supply is ensured.'
However, the 1991 California Drought Water Bank included some priorities into its
framework: there were rules to prioritize among different buyers according to how serious
the effects of the shortage would be for them. Demands arising from emergency situations
related to health and safety were to be satisfied first, then critical needs such as those of
urban users receiving less than 75% normal supply or farmers growing permanent crops.
Yet, these priorities did not need to be applied since there was less demand for water than
water purchased and, thus, the California Department of Water Resources ensured more
water flow and carry-over storage.1 4
The restrictions in Spain-ranking of uses and transferring only to another usercould be justified if they translated into a less demanding review procedure because transactions that are less prone to affect third parties are the only ones allowed in the first place.
Before the 1999 Amendment, when those restrictions did not exist, to complete a transaction, the authorization process was extremely cumbersome. After the Amendment, the procedure to authorize a transaction was shorter (two months), but the procedural steps were
not spelled out. There is no guidance on who has the burden of proof or what the role of
participation is for third parties. California has a cumbersome procedure that differentiates
between long-term and short-term transactions, but guidance on the procedural steps indispensable to get that transaction through abounds.
The second problem regarding the lease mechanism is that the approval of such a
transaction does not imply the authorization for the construction or use of pipes, canals,
and mains. When infrastructure is private and used for permit leases, regulations establish
that the owner of the infrastructure and the parties to a transaction need to agree. There is
no imposition of common carier duties. 105 The regulation does not rule out direct denial
of permission to use or other practices such as discriminatory rates. When the infrastructure is public, the approval for the use of the infrastructure is independent from the approval of the transfer. This additional approval seems quite an unnecessary duplication of

103. Guidebookfor Implementation of Senate Bill 610 and Senate Bill 221 of 2001, CAL. DEP'T OF WATER
RES. (Oct. 8, 2003) (to assist water suppliers, cities, and counties in integrating water and land use planning).
104. Richard Howitt et al., Incremental Water Market Development: The California Water Sector 1985-2004,
30 CAN. WATER RES. J. 73 (2005).
105. See CWA art. 70.
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proceedings since the same administrative body-the agency managing a basin-authorizes both. Provided the infrastructure has spare capacity, there is no need for many other
findings because externalities will have already been considered when reviewing the transfer. Interestingly, even the periods to decide on the transfer and on the use of infrastructure
are different with the period for the use of infrastructure being longer (four months). However, a positive feature is that if the administration does not decide on time, the use of
infrastructure is considered authorized. California also separates procedures if there is a
need for authorization to ship water using the infrastructure, but there is a clear duty to
06
allow third parties to transfer water using up to 70% of unused capacity.1
In Spain, the consensus among lawyers who deal with lease contracts is that the
authorization for the use of existing infrastructure is less of a hurdle than the use of interbasin infrastructure, 0 7 since the latter always implies a delay and involves more complex
transactions, given its greater potential for externalities. In some cases, this may become a
political question, and some externalities might be disregarded to serve particular interests.
This was the case during the 2007-2008 drought crisis. In addition to the Ebro transfer, the Decree also authorized the use of the pipe for transporting water under water leasing contracts, a market mechanism. The Real Decreto-Ley authorized public agencies or
private actors designated by the Autonomous Community authorities to buy rights from
farmers who are members of an irrigation community in the Ebro Region. These sales
which would not have been part of a water bank could not be banned by the irrigation
community, but the community must send a report to the Ebro Hydrographic Confederation, the basin authority which has the power to approve the contact. This authorization
did not follow the path set forth in the Consolidated Water Act, and instead it opted for an
open authorization before anyone applied for it; therefore, externalities would have been
disregarded. However, the connection was never built. A lack of connections contributes
to the failure of water markets, and are also a consequence of that failure. The connections
discussed, like that in Ebro, do not imply a great investment. But, if there are over-allocated rivers, those infrastructure connections only make sense when transactions are likely
to happen. In Catalonia and Spain, transactions are not likely to happen.
Some high-ranked officials of the Catalan Water Agency half-heartedly tried to dress
up this Ebro transfer as a scheme to buy irrigators rights, as they had done when arguing
for the connection between Segre agricultural region farmers and urban districts. 108 Surprisingly, irrigators in the Ebro region did not agree to water exchanges, and instead they
were willing to save water collectively and freely send it to the Barcelona's Metropolitan
Area. 09 This evidences the lack of market culture for water. They probably feared that if
106. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1810-14.
107. Interview with M6nica Sastre, Attomey at Arifio Villar, Madrid, Spain (July 27, 2012).

108. Amau Ugell, Transvasamentde la conca alta del Segre a l'A4rea Metropolitanade Barcelona [Transfer
from the Upper-Basinof the Segre River to the Barcelona's MetropolitanArea], OBSERVATORI DE PROJECTES I
DEBATS
TERRITORIALS
A
CATALUNYA
(Dec.
31,
2008),
http://territori.scot.cat/cat/notices/2008/12/transvasament de la conca alta dcl segrea_l Area metropolitan
a de barcelona_2008_172.php.
109. See id. They might have fear the application of Article 65 of the CWA, which empowers the agency to
review the licenses granted if it assesses that the holder needs less water to fulfill his needs. There is no clear
protection against this article, but it might be implicit since it is expressly establish that water rights lease contracts (Article 69) will not affect the lapsing of the license (Article 66) which is triggered if the user if use is
interrupted for three years in a row.
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water was sold, one would assume they did not need it and, thus, their rights would be
forfeited.
This fear is precisely the third problem that leases encounter. Like in California,
water rights must be used in Spain; if they are not, they are subject to forfeiture. In Spain,
the period of non-use is three years while in California it is five. Both jurisdictions also
have provisions ensuring that water is used reasonably. In California, appropriative rights
are subject to beneficial use requirements and in Spain, permits could be revised if the
River Basin Authority (RBA) determined the same goal could be achieved with less water.' " 0 The California Water Code has been amended several times to ensure that those
transferring water are certain that their underlying right is not going to be affected."' Conversely, Spain has fallen short and has failed to enact any provision particularly tailored to
calm those fears.
2. Water Exchange Centers
Water Exchange Centers (centros de intercambio de derechos) are structures inspired by California's experience in 1991, 112 and agencies play the role of match-maker.
However, the scope of water banks in Spain is smaller, as it is a basin rather than the whole
country. It would be similar to the water banks organized by local or regional organizations
in the U.S. if it were not for the centralization effect: authorization by the central government cabinet is required before the River Basin Authority establishes them. Such an authorization can be quite broad. For instance, the 2004 authorization permitted establishment of centros de intercambio de derechos in the Guadiana, Segura, and Jucar water
basins.'13 This authorization was given in October 2004, a rainy month ahead of the
drought to come.
110. See CWA art. 65.2.
11I. Since 1979, water conserved was not subject to forfeiture according to CAL. WATER CODE § 1011. In
1982, it was made clear that under this section water not used or conserved could be transferred without fear of
forfeiture; it is considered that transferred water complies with the beneficial use requirement. However, those
provisions were not enough. During the period this dissertation focuses on, the CAL. WATER CODE was amended
several times to ensure that in the doctrine of beneficial use, conserved water or water unused as a result of
fallowing for a transfer was not going to be considered waste and therefore the rights of the transferor could not
be curtailed. In 1991, CAL. WATER CODE § 484(a) was introduced, which ensures that the water that the transferor
would have used or stored could be transferable without being detrimental to him. Then in 1999, more provisions
trying to increase certainty were enacted. The 1999 amendments emphasized that neither a transfer nor a proposed
transfer could trigger any water rights review and that the only limitations which could be imposed must be a
consequence of the transaction and tied to it. See § 1014. In fact, § 1011 could be seen as redundant because the
1999 reform also shifted the focus from the transferor to the transferee. So far as the transferee puts the water to
beneficial use, it should not negatively affect the transferor's right. If the transferee violates the beneficial use
requirement, the water reverts back to the transferor. See § 1015.
112. Guia Nueva Cultura del Agua, "Mercados pziblicos" paraga gestionar la escasez,
http://www.fnca.eu/guia-nucva-cultura-del-agua/ a-economia-dcl-agua/mercados-publicos-para-gcstionar-lacscasez (last visited Feb. 28, 2016); Antonio Embid Irujo, Una nuevaforma de asignacidnde recursos:El ercado
del agua" [A New Form of Resource Allocation: The Water Market], Ingenieria y Territorio, REVISTA DEL
COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS DE CAMINOS, CANALES Y PUERTOS 38,38 (2000).
113. Acuerdo del Consejo de Ministros (Cabinet Decision) (Oct. 15, 2004) (authorized the establishment of
"centros de intcrcambio de derechos" in the Guadiana, Segura, and Jucar water basins),
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodcministros/refcrencias/Paginas/2004/c 1510040.aspx#DerechosAgua.
The nine interregional RBAs are Mifio-Sil, Cantibrico, Duero, Ebro, Guadalquivir, Guadiana, Jucar, Segura, and
Tagus; and seven regional ones: Andalusia-Atlantic, Andalusia-Mediterranean, Balearic Islands, Basque
Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, and Galicia. The interregional ones govern river basins shared among different regions.
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This prior authorization can entail a delay in any reaction to a drought unless the
authorization is granted in advance, as was the case for the three basins mentioned in 2004.
It must be noted that it did not apply to all the basins. The time taken to overcome these
bureaucratic hurdles may be precious time wasted in other cases. The nested nature-that
is the decision to establish a bank and the authorization being decided at two different
levels-and lack of permanency slow down the reaction to a crisis. For example, in the
Segura Basin, it took more than two years fiorn the announcement to the actual implementation of the center.' 14 For the internal river basins in Catalonia, the Catalan Parliament
included water exchange centers in the emergency decrees as a possibility.' 15 In the end,
political will never materialized to bring them about and the Catalan Water Agency never
implemented the exchange centers.
Currently, in the different Spanish Drought Plans passed since 2007, several ConfederacionesHidrognificasinclude the exchange centers as a measure triggered by certain
drought scenarios.1 16 However, as stated, they cannot be automatically triggered, and this
ends up being just programmatic: it is required that the central government gives them the
green light beforehand.
As the 1991, the 1992, or the 1994 California Water Banks and Spanish centros de
intercambioare not permanent, RBAs are allowed to set up Water Exchange Centers in
exceptional circumstances: overexploitation of aquifers, severe drought, and instances
117
where the uses should be limited to guaranteeing a rational exploitation of the resource.
The centers last only until the crisis is over. However, the authorization requirement previously discussed runs counter to the need to respond quickly to crisis. The 1991 Water
Bank was organized in record time: California Governor Pete Wilson signed an Executive
Order on February 1, 1991, establishing the Drought Action Team, which recommended
setting up a Bank on its report issued February 15, 1991,118 and the Bank was working in
less than one hundred days thanks to the quick response of the state government. 119
Delay in response to a crisis is also caused by water exchange centers following
Spanish public procurement regulations, which impose several formal requirements to ensure that the process is competitive. 120 Private parties have to adapt to the requirements of
114. Javier Calatrava Leyva, Mercados y bancos de agua en Espaha: Legislaci6n y experiencias vigentes
[Water Markets and Water Banks in Spain: Legislation and Experiences], in AGRICULTURA FAMILIAR EN

ESPARA 99, 103 (2006), http://www.upa.es/anuario 2006/pag 099-105 calatrava.pdf.
115. 3d Additional Provision Decret 84/2007, de 3 d'abril,d'adopci6de mesures excepcionals i d'emerg4ncia
en relaci6amb la utilitzaci6 dels recursos hidrics, DOGC 4860, (Apr. 12, 2007) (Catalan Decree adopting ex-

ceptional and emergency measures in relation to the use of water resources).
116. See e.g., Executive Report Drought Preparedness Plan Tajo River Basin 97 (2007) (mentioning that more
water leases might be expected).
117. See CWA art. 71. The exceptional situations are described in CWA articles 55, 56, and 58.
118.
119.

Id.
THE 1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK 1, 19 (1992), http://www.water.ca.gov/watertransfers/docs/

0 1991-

water bank.pdf.
120. The general regulation of public procurement is established by the following Act: Real Decreto Legisla-

tivo 3/2011, de 14 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley do Contratos del Sector
Piblico (B.O.E. 2011/276). From 2007 on, the regulation could be found in Ley 30/2007, de 30 de octubre, dc

Contratos del Sector Ptiblico (B.O.E. 2007/271) and from 2000 to 2007 in Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos do las Administraciones Pblicas, aprobado por el Real Decrcto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 do junio (B.O.E.
2000/241). The different regulations are increasingly influenced by the European Union requirements and despite
the fact that they may differ in the details, the principles are the same. Basically, the principles of transparency
and competition must be carefully respected to prevent favoring certain companies with taxpayer money or which
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the tender, which includes, among other things, precise terms and a secret offer. This may
reduce the pool of potential sellers. Additionally, it curtails the administrative discretion,
like any other public procurement contract, in order to ensure that there are no corrupt
practices. These requirements do not seem to target the needs of water management since
they slow down the process and, in general, involve very little danger of favorable treatment because they would consist of buying or leasing atomized water rights to resell or
release them. These constraints also curtail the flexibility of the administration since the
time period between the offer publication, the reception of the tenders, and the resolution
is quite long. In any case, the requirements imply that these banks have to operate in
batches and the time period between offers and adjudications is too long to properly respond to a crisis. For example, in the Jucar Basin, an offer was published in the Official
Gazette on December 2006, and the decision about which rights were leased was published
on July 2007.121 Water banks are theoretically closer to spot markets; Spanish centros de
intercambio are far from being so. Parties may not want such a slow process even if they
could benefit from the guarantee. California water banks, like Spanish ones, fixed the price
while decreasing transaction costs by providing sample contracts. In 1991 only one option
was offered, while in 1992 there was a portfolio of contracts, which allowed a certain
22
tailoring for the different transactions.1
Spanish centros de intercambio have never worked in real markets. Instead, they
have been used as mechanisms for CHs to purchase water for the environment, much like
the CALFED Environmental Water Account. 23 One of them, in the Guadiana basin, ended
up reallocating the majority of the water rights to consumptive uses but not through market
transactions. 24 In 1991, the California water bank acquired water for instream uses. The
bank's main purpose was not environmental protection but the environment benefited because sales ended up being fewer than purchases; less users decided to buy water from the
bank after the spring rains.125 Additionally, since 1991, in California, existing right-holders
could transfer water to in-stream uses, 126 a possibility that does not exist in Spain.
One commonality between these two jurisdictions concerning water banks is that
factors other than market mechanisms (e.g., demand) are sometimes pursued to determine
reallocation. In the Jucar basin, externalities affecting the environment or third parties are
mitigated since the amount sold will be reduced to a certain percentage to be fixed in order
will not provide proper public services. This means that the RBA has to issue a Public Offer of Acquisition
calling for applications of those who want to lease their water and fulfill the requirements set forth in the offer.
Those applications must be hand in before a deadline in secret envelopes. They are reviewed all at once and then
the resolution of which ones will be. After that, the resolution of which ones will be bought will be publicized.
121. B.O.E. 165/2007. There was an extension to present more offer of rights to be acquired.
122. Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, RECENT CALIFORNIA WATER TRANSFERS: EMERGING OPTIONS FOR WATER
MANAGEMENT 32, 63 (US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (1992)).
123. "The CALFED Bay-Delta Program is a unique collaboration among 25 state and federal agencies that
came together with a mission: to improve Califomia's water supply and the ecological health of the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta." About, CALFED, http://calwater.ca.gov/calfed/about/ (last visited
on Mar. 27, 2016).
124.

ROSA REQUENA, CENTRO DE INTERCAMBIOS EN EL ALTO GUADIANA [EXCHANGE CENTER IN ALTO

GUADIANA] 23 (2011), http://www.ceigram.upm.es/sfs/otros/ceigram/Contenidos%201nvestigaciC3Bn /eontenido%20seminarios%20cientificos/CENTROS%20DE%201NTERCAMBI 0%20MADRID 2706201 1.ppt.

125. Howitt et al., supra note 104, at 74 (report that 810,713.19 acre-ft were bought and 405,356.59 acre-ft
round numbers in cubic meters).
126. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707.
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to contribute to the recovery and maintenance of the water. 127 In California, 1991 Water
Bank buyers had to demonstrate that they were using current available water supplies at
their maximum, implementing appropriate conservation practices. 128 Markets are supposed to encourage efficient use on both sides-buyers and sellers-because water will be
properly priced and, thus, buyers would implement conservation measures if it is more
efficient to do so. However, California's rules impose conservation requirements, which
means that buyers may have had to implement water saving measures even if they were
more expensive than actually buying water.
As the previous explanation has exposed, water markets in Spain, and consequently
in Catalonia, have design flaws, and water agencies have lacked the will to make markets
thrive. The following table summarizes those flaws and how California's experience has,
if at all, addressed the same issues. Most of the design problems in the Spanish water
market framework are not present in the California system, as the Golden State has done
a better job with implementation. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn for other water markets and for all U.S. Western states regarding the ability of certain drought emergency
decisions to thwart or preempt markets, as the next section further discusses.
Governmental role
Definition of
property rights:
Tradability

Definition of
property rights:
Certainty

Externalities:
Review
procedure for
transactions

127.
128.

Shortcoming in Spanish Water
Markets
Water leases can only happen between those already holding permits.
Trades have to respect the Ranking
of uses.
Users were not given proper assurances that the underlying water
right would not be reviewed by the
administration after entering on a
transaction because they fear that
leasing the water may show that
they do not need it.

Streamlined procedure in the books.
Procedural regulations lack guidance

Yague-C6rdova, supra note 97, at 10.
Israel & Lund, supra note 122, at 6.

Potential solution
adopted in California
Trades can happen between a
willing buyer and a willing
seller provided there are not
harmful effects for third parties
Provisions were enacted to
ensure that users are not subject to forfeiture for non-use
when entering into water
transactions. Also, several
provisions ensure that the water sold still fulfills the requirements to be considered
as put to beneficial use.
Cumbersome procedure differentiating between short
term and long term transactions. Most of the transactions are also subject to the
California Environmental
Quality Act. However, the
agencies offer plenty of guidance on how to deal with the
procedure.
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Natural
monopoly:
Infrastructure

Market maker:
Water banks
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No clear common carrier duty assigned. Separate authorization when
the owner of the transaction is a
public agency. When the owner is a
private party, the parties need to
bargain,

Water banks require several steps to
be set up. Those steps imply decisions by different levels of government that causes delay and prevents
timely response to droughts. Water
banks are subject to public procurement regulations which do not suit
the type of small transactions occurring.

Infrastructure is open to third
parties up to 70% of unused
capacity.
Nonetheless, California also
has the same problem regarding the authorization procedure: there are separate reviews for infrastructure use
and for the transaction.
Water banks were a game
changer. They helped to intemalize the idea that water
markets are a permanent tool
for water management. Not
only water banks themselves
decrease transaction costs because the administration is
the broker, but California water agencies learned after
1991 that offering forms and
information further enhanced
the performance of water
markets.

V. CONCLUSION

This article provides a novel descriptive account of the geographic, political, governance, and institutional features related to water in Catalonia (Spain) in order to understand the options available to regions that face structural scarcity and periodical droughts.
Accordingly, it further presents a case study of the 2007-2008 drought crises in Catalonia,
which called into question the appropriateness of an administrative management system
in controlling a scare resource. This article has analyzed the solutions that address supply
and demand, which have been adopted in Catalonia, with special emphasis on one solution
that did not play a role in the management of the drought crisis: water markets.
Spanish water markets presented a lot of design flaws, which prevented them from
taking off as water management tools. Public agencies did not embrace them as tools to
solve water misallocation and did not build expertise on how to oversee them. This, coupled with the lack of market culture (i.e. the reluctance that water users feel towards transferring their water), caused markets to become inactive, and prevented users from contributing to the mitigation of structural water scarcity. In addition, it is expected for water
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markets to be more active when there is a drought, but that was not the case during the
2007-2008 droughts, due to management through emergency measures.
In particular, in Catalonia, water markets were not welcomed, not even in the event
of a crisis. To exactly understand what difference markets could make within an administrative regime, it is interesting to refer back to the management of the 2007-2008 drought
in Barcelona. Household use was not curtailed in the city, but it could have been. It was
nonetheless curtailed in some suburban areas where it was forbidden to irrigate lawns and
fill pools. Transactions between agricultural producers and the cities could have prevented
them. But the decrees mostly shielded urban areas and, thus, urban water suppliers did not
have incentives to enter into water leases to mitigate the effects of the crisis.
Even if private parties did not shield themselves from a drought by entering into
transactions before the crisis, water contracts could have corrected the restriction decisions
made by the administrative agencies (who, during a drought, decide which types of uses
should get water and which should not) without taking into account the specific marginal
value. But, most cuts were suffered by agricultural areas, and the anticipation of such discretionary restrictions may have cast uncertainty about who would get water. Thus, transactions were prevented in advance. In addition, as section IV.C has analyzed, the Spanish
regulation of water markets also prevents private parties from responding quickly to a crisis.
The Catalan Emergency Decree's provision establishing water banks was never implemented. Instead, mandated transfers seemed to be the default rule. The transfers between the Ebro or Segre and the Barcelona Metropolitan area, sponsored by Spanish and
Catalan authorities respectively, were framed by certain officials as potential exchange
frameworks, but such an approach was not accepted. Instead, it was pretended that there
was surplus water, and transfers were mandated. However, transfers were not real solutions because the Ebro and Segre rivers, despite not being in an acute state, did not have
enough water. As these rivers suffer from a Mediterranean climate similar to the Internal
Basins, there was not surplus water in the long term. If a market would have been established, water that would have been used anyway that could have transfer from low value
users to cities, thus alleviating the problem. Infrastructure was discussed to allow the mandated transfers, which could have also provided the channels allowing for the operation of
water banks or private contracts. Furthermore, in the long run, infrastructure use is relatively inexpensive, and temporary or permanent water contracts could have taken place
allowing agents to permanently ensure their supplies or plans for potential water shortages.
However, the infrastructure was not built. Mandated transfers have a history of discontent
which made them highly unpopular even amidst a drought and water markets had not been
embraced as a tool of water management, neither by private users nor by public agencies.
The unplanned administrative response to drought crisis negatively affects the role
that water markets may have in the future, under both normal and drought conditions,
because it creates uncertainty about who will receive water. This same problem can occur
in any Western state where agencies undertake the same use restrictions. In its 2014 emergency measures, California, which already has a better water market design (even though
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it recently adopted cuts), included provisions aimed at reducing the costs of water transactions by streamlining the administrative review procedure. 129 Also, in contrast with the
ineffective provisions in Catalonia's emergency decrees about water banks, water banks
have played a great role in California. While under Spanish regulations procedural requirements make those banks unsuited to fulfill their purported goal (i.e. mitigate drought scenarios), water banks in California have been an example of quick response and have improved in every water shortage experience.
Beginning in 2007, Spanish basins started designing and enacting Drought Preparedness Plans. Thus, the future will prove whether predictability is achieved with those
documents or whether uncertainty will still exist because emergency measures will still
rule during drought crisis. Some of those plans have included water transactions and water
banks among their emergency measures. Perhaps Spain learned the lesson, but in this
learning process fifteen years of experience on how to better articulate water markets has
been lost.
Regarding drought planning, the situation west of the 100th meridian is unequal.
States such as Nevada, California, or New Mexico extensively discuss drought preparedness in their water plans. Meanwhile, others, such as Utah or Idaho, have little to no discussion of drought preparedness in their plans. Furthermore, Colorado and a few other
states have specific plans to deal with droughts. Regardless of a state's plan, emergency
measures are likely to play a role. If measures are enacted beyond what the Drought Preparedness Plan established in Spain, they should be crafted in such a way that enhances
the role that water markets could play.

129. Governor Jerry Brown of California included provisions inhis decrees to reduce transaction costs to enlist
water market transactions inthe state's strategy to mitigate the effects of the drought even though water for urban
consumers was ensured. Among other pro-transfer measures adopted, the package streamlined the review procedure by exempting water transfers from California Environmental Quality Act Review. The measure has been
criticized by environmentalists and, rightly so, because it tries to enhance water transactions lowering the barriers
that protect the environment. The haste ofthe measure may explain this reaction. Perhaps the measures to enhance
markets should be thought through and enacted with a long-term view while ensuring a stable framework that
deals with situations of low availability of water.

